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I. BACKGROUND
Immunity has been proven to be not only a living anachronism, but
one which often leads to impunity for the worst kinds of rights violations. It
was precisely real and feared impunity that led to changes in the way in
which state immunity was understood and applied, therefore, creating the
very welcomed distinction between the different qualities under which the
acts of a state could be catalogued.' Although it is not the purpose of this
article to revise the history and development of the several theories
regarding immunity, the authors believe it necessary to start by briefly
recalling from where immunities come-a sovereign act of comity-to
where they should be redirected to-that is, a world in which international
actors are accountable for their acts.
* Greta L. Rios is an independent consultant on International Human Rights Law and
International Humanitarian Law in Mexico. Her experience comprehends work for the Mexican
Ministry of the Interior's Human Rights Unit. Presently, the projects she is involved with include close
collaboration with Mexico City's Human Rights Commission as a research and public policy advisor.
** Edward Patrick Flaherty is an American lawyer admitted to practice before the
Massachusetts SJC, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the 2nd Circuit Federal Court of Appeal; he is a
partner in the Swiss international law firm of Schwab, Flaherty & Associis, and focuses his practice on
the representation of staff members of international organizations, and third parties injured by
International Organizations (IOs). He is also the co-founder of the Centre for Accountability of
International Organizations (www.caio-ch.org) and 10 Watch (www.iowatch.org).
1. Acts dejure imperii-where the State is acting on its sovereign capacity-and acts dejure
gestionis-where the State engages in administrative affairs, such as commercial contracts.
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In other words, immunity should promote the existence of a legal
framework where every actor can be held responsible for their actions,
whether they are acting on their own, on instructions from a third party, as
part of an international operation, on behalf of someone else, or under any
other circumstances. Ideal as this may sound, this is actually what marks
the difference between the rule of law and the rule of man and the very
thing which lies precisely at the base of every legal system, thus providing
its subjects with a system that grants them judicial protection as well as
resources for claiming their rights.2
Let us keep in mind that the regime under which absolute immunity of
states prevailed was one that existed several decades ago, i.e., before World
2. This includes the access that every person must be granted to effective remedies against
violations to their rights. As such, this principle has been codified in several core Human Rights
instruments. For instance, Article 2.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities,
or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State,
and to develop the possibilities ofjudicial remedy;
c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.13.
Another instrument codifying this principle is Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which states that "(e)veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/8 10, at 71, art. 12 (1948). Perhaps the
clearest example lies within the Interamerican Convention on Human Rights, which actually calls it "the
Right to Judicial Protection" and codifies it in its Article 25, as follows:
Article 25. Right to Judicial Protection
1) Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate
his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state
concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been
committed by persons acting in the course oftheir official duties.
2) The States Parties undertake:
a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights
determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
state;
b) to develop the possibilities ofjudicial remedy; and
c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 25, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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War II.3  The international scenario was governed and decided by the
actions of the states, and the only subjects of International Law were thus
States. As such, each sovereign state was free to do as it saw fit.
The notion of absolute immunity was inherited by this system of states
from the previous one-a system where sovereign rulers had the power to
impose their will upon their subjects and were not able to be brought before
any other sovereign's court.4 In other words, absolute sovereign immunity
came into being as a privilege that sovereigns recognized with regards to
each other, thus enabling them to perform any kind of act with no
repercussions whatsoever. It is important to recall that sovereigns granted
such immunities on the basis of comity and correctly considered them to be
privileges, not rights of any kind.'
When the international system stopped being one of relations among
sovereigns, but among sovereign states, many of the rules that applied to
the previous setting were automatically inherited by the new system.6
Sadly, this was the case for the rules regarding immunity.
This is how states became absolutely immune from prosecution of any
kind, presumably because very little thought was given to the matter.
Nevertheless, with the passing of time, it became evident that if the system
was to work properly-especially regarding commercial deals between
states and private individuals that could be reliable, and, therefore, good for
business-making-absolute immunity would have to make way for judicial
protection.
This was how the preconceived and never-before-questioned rules
regarding immunity underwent a deep transformation over the last half
century that resulted in a new scheme, where states could retain some of the
privileges that were afforded to them, just by the mere fact of being
sovereign nations, while they renounced other such privileges for the sake
of protecting the international business environment.'
Thus came into being the distinction between the different kinds of
actions a state could undergo, as a fundamental pillar in the theory of State
immunities. States could, from then on, engage in acts that only their
capacities of states could afford them, such as conducting an armed
invasion in order to protect their own interests, and still be immune from
prosecution in foreign jurisdictions: on the other hand, they were no longer
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See generally Edward Patrick Flaherty & Greta L. Rios, International Organization
reform or impunity? Immunity is the problem, 16 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 433 (2010).
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capable of incurring breaches of commercial contracts and avoiding the
legal consequences for such actions.
As International Organizations (IOs) came onto scene, they just
adopted the rules of the then existing geo-political system:9 That is, they
entered into the game and played it applying the absolute immunity rule,
simply because at the moment there was no alternative. This was also
justified by a functional theory, according to which, IOs needed to be
afforded immunity, so as to ensure that they would be able to duly perform
their duties without any external interference from sovereign states with
their mandates.10 The reason behind this functional immunity theory was to
grant IOs enough range of action so they could get to perform their
mandates-as usually, but not always, delegated to them by sovereign
states collectively-without obstacles, such as political or financial issues
that would distract them from their greater goals." Immunity of IOs was
also supposed to guarantee their impartiality and thus, their proper
functioning. 12
In 1945, absolute immunity of the United Nations Organization was
codified by its Treaty on Privileges and Immunities." Since then, many
aspects of the international arena have shifted, including the ways in which
international relations are conducted. Even the notions of who the subjects
of international law are have changed.
IOs have expanded and are no longer feeble and in need of protection
of any kind.'4  As such, there is no further need for the "functional
necessity" doctrine of immunities. 5 Even more, the continuation of such a
model is nowadays acting, not as a guarantee that IOs will be able to
comply with their mandates of peace and the protection of human rights,
but as an obstacle to them attaining these lofty goals.
II. THE SCENARIO TODAY
As the United Nations (U.N.) and its affiliated and specialized
agencies take on more and more of the international community's sovereign
dirty work-peace-keeping, protection of refugees, disaster relief,
8. Id. at 437.
9. Id. 436-38.
10. Id. at 437.
11. Id.
12. Flaherty & Rios, supra note 7, at 436.
13. Id. at 438.
14. Id. at 454.
15. Id.
442 [Vol. I18:2
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etc.-and as the size of their staff, who generally enjoy immunity from
national or municipal laws, grows apace, the number of incidents where IOs
or their officials have caused serious harm or injury to third parties has also
grown.' 6 A mere small sample of the harm that the IOs, such as the U.N.
and its officials inflict on innocent third parties around the world today,
many of which victims are those very people such organisations exist to
protect and serve, are:
1) The introduction of cholera in Haiti, after its devastating
January 2010 earthquake by U.N. peacekeepers from Nepal,
that killed nearly 6,500 Haitians to-date-and counting with
no likely abatement in sight-and sickened almost another
half million;
2) The siting of a Roma refugee camp in Kosovo by UNHCR
on the lead tailings of an abandoned mine that has not
surprisingly resulted in the acute lead poisoning and
permanent neurological impairment of many of the refugee
children;
3) The on-going sexual abuse of refugee girls and women by
U.N. staff and peacekeepers, despite the U.N.'s professed
"zero tolerance" policy;
4) The inability or failure of U.N. peacekeepers to stop the
mass systematic rape of more than 500 women and girls in
Eastern Congo by Rwandan and Congolese rebels in
August 2010, through either gross misfeasance or simple
cowardice;
5) The recent claim of diplomatic immunity by the former
head of the International Monetary Fund to try to block a
civil suit brought against him by his alleged hotel maid,
rape victim.
The on-going tolerance in deed, if not word, of wide-spread sexual
harassment within IOs among their staff is another example of this sad state
of affairs.17 In most national societies, criminal and civil tort systems have
developed first to compensate innocent victims of wrongful injuries or acts
inflicted upon them by others, and also to serve as an incentive for those in
a position of trust or responsibility to such innocent victims to discharge
their obligations with reasonable care, in the future, lest they be exposed to
substantial financial liability for their failure to exercise such care.' 8
16. Id. at 439.
17. Flaherty & Rios, supra note 7, at 443.
18. Id. at 454.
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In recent years, a whole theory on state responsibility and
accountability towards victims of great violations has also developed. At
this point, even some of the most heinous state crimes against victims of
violent regimes, often vigorously denied, have been investigated by their
governments and truth commissions. Most modem states now grant proper
judicial remedies and have provided proper legal recourse in the cases of
thousands of victims whose victimizers were, in many cases, agents of the
state.19 It is important to point out that in many cases, the perpetrators of
such violations had enjoyed immunity from prosecution at the time the
atrocities occurred. Many of these immunities were lifted later on for the
sake of guaranteeing the victims' access to justice.
Unfortunately, contrary to the overriding trend in international law
today to limit and restrict immunities of sovereign states-and their
representatives-to those absolutely necessary for a state to carry out its
fundamental sovereign functions, carving out express exceptions to such
immunities in cases of commercial activity or civil-tort-wrongs, IOs and
their officials, until recently, have enjoyed near total immunity for their
criminal, contractual, or tortious acts carried out in the context of their
duties.20
It may be necessary at this point to explain that several of the activities
that IOs carry out today on a regular basis, were never envisioned by their
founders, and as such, the legal framework governing actions of great
contemporary importance, such as Peacekeeping Operations and missions
where civil police forces and international observers are deployed, is in its
infancy or completely lacking.2 '
However, as history has shown us, changes usually occur before legal
frameworks are fully developed, through practice and out of necessity. As
such, it is of particular relevance that recent developments in the United
States and Europe suggest that this shameful trend of absolute immunity
may finally be changing as well for IOs, forcing them into line with the best
state practice. Below are some examples of the cases that may be leading
the way into the beginning of the end of 10 impunity.
A. The Swarna v. Al-Awadi case (2010)
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a very promising decision
regarding the Swarna v. Al-Awadi case in 2010 regarding the invocation of
diplomatic immunities and how this defence on admissibility may lead to
19. Id. at 454.
20. For the most senior officials of such organisations, their immunities extended even to
criminal or tortious acts that were in no way related to the function of their organisation.
21. Flaherty & Rios, supra note 7, at 454.
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impunity regarding violations of human rights, including those asserted in
the context of a labour relationship.
Swarna, an Indian national, was offered to serve as a domestic
employee in the household of Al-Awadi, a Kuwaiti diplomat serving at his
country's Mission to the United Nations in New York.22 She accepted the
offer and moved to New York City in 1996.23
The complainant was allegedly abused on several occasions by her
employers, including the diplomat's wife.24 They retained her travel
documents, refused to pay her the agreed salary, prevented her from leaving
their household, not even to attend church on Sundays, and denied her
communications with her family in India.2 5  Al-Awadi raped Swarna
several times during the four years she remained in his household, before
she managed to recover her passport and visa and seek help.26
Swarna filed an action against the defendants in U.S. Federal Court in
2002.27 Neither of them responded to her complaint, and the District Court
ruled that it had no jurisdiction over Swarna's case due to the fact that by
2002, Al-Awadi was still employed as a diplomat by the Kuwaiti Mission,
and therefore, could not be brought before any national court, according to
the rules governing diplomatic immunity.28 The District Court even went
so far as to state that the complainant could institute new proceedings when
29the defendant was no longer employed by his Mission.
In 2006, Swarna filed action against the complainants again, this time
including the State of Kuwait as one of her defendants.3 0 Once more, none
of them answered the complaint, so Swama filed a motion for default
judgement. 3 1 Both the individual defendants and the State of Kuwait
replied to Swarna's motion for default judgment in 2008.32
The District Court made some interesting findings in Swarna's case.
First of all, it held that her claim against the individual defendants was not
barred by immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
22. See Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 130 (2nd Cir. 2010).
23. Id. at 128.
24. Id. at 128-30.
25. Id.
26. Swarna, 622 F.3d at 130.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 130-31.
31. Swarna, 622 F.3d at 130-31.
32. Id.
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Relations.3 3 Regarding Swarna's claims on the State of Kuwait, the Court
held that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 34 her request
for default judgment could not be granted.35  Both Swarna and the
individual defendants moved for reconsideration of the District Court's
decision.36 Both motions were rejected, and the previous decision was, held
by the Court.
Swarna and the individual defendants appealed the District Court's
decision for different reasons to the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeal.
The Al-Awadi family argued that Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations39 granted them "residual immunity" for acts
performed while serving as diplomats, and further, that the employment of
Swama as a domestic worker was protected under the same Convention as
part of a diplomat's mission-related functions.40 On her part, Swarna
argued that the District Court erred in dismissing her claims against the
State of Kuwait, because they fell within the FSIA's exception to immunity
regarding tort and commercial.activities.4 1
1. The Federal Court of Appeals' decision
While the Court agreed that under Article 39(2) of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, former diplomats retain residual
immunity for some kinds of acts performed while serving in the diplomatic
station, it held that in the case under discussion, no such legal provision
33. Id. at 131.
34. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
35. See generally Swama v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
36. Id.
37. See generally Swarna v. Al-Awadi, No. 06 Civ. 4880, 2009 WL 1562811 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
38. Id.
39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Article 39.2 of the Vienna Convention reads:
When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to
an end, such privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when
he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but
shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with
respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a
member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.
Id. 2 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. See generally Swaina v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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could be applied. 42 To begin with, defendant Al-Shaitan, Al-Awadi's wife,
never served as a diplomat, and thus, this argument was moot in relation to
her.43 With regards to Al-Awadi, the test used to determine whether he
possessed residual immunity, as established by the Vienna Convention,
consisted of determining if the acts he performed in relation to Swarna's
employment and alleged treatment were done in the exercise of his
functions as a member of the mission." On this point, the Court recalls that
the Vienna Convention does not immunize those acts that result
"incidental" to the performance of a diplomat's functions as a member of
the mission.45
According to the Court, acts that deserve immunization are those
"directly imputable to the state or inextricably tied to a diplomat's
professional activities." Since Swarna was employed by the defendants to
meet their private needs, as opposed to performing mission-related
functions, the Court concluded that in this case, the argument of residual
immunity could not be sustained.47 The Court went further to state that in
relation to Swarna's alleged rape, "[i]f Swarna's work for the family may
not be considered part of any mission-related functions, surely enduring
rape would not be part of those functions either.""
On this topic, the Court was particularly emphatic and went on to say:
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Swarna's employment
constituted an official act, it does not follow that Al-Awadi is
accorded immunity for any and all acts committed against her.
For example, while Al-Awadi could claim diplomatic immunity
for common crimes directed at Swarna while he was serving as a
member of the mission, he could not commit these crimes and
claim residual immunity merely because his initial hiring of
Swarna constituted an official act. Only if the commission of
such crimes could be considered an official act would residual
immunity apply.49
The Court's reasoning in Swarna is of particular relevance to the
development of case law regarding the changing application of immunities
42. See Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 130 (2nd Cir. 2010).
43. Id. at 134.
44. Id. at 134-38.
45. Id. at 135.
46. Id.
47. See Swarna v. AI-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 135 (2nd Cir. 2010).
48. Id. at 138.
49. Id. at 139-40.
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of IOs for several reasons. In the first place, it endorses the idea that even if
immunity were to be applied to Al-Awadi with respect to the alleged acts, it
would, under no circumstance, be absolute, since the "official acts" defense
cannot possibly include actions that would otherwise be classified as
crimes.so Under this logic, even if the Court had ruled that hiring Swarna
had been an official act performed as part of Al-Awadi's functions as a
diplomat, the constant abuse and inhumane conditions to which she was
submitted could not have been catalogued as official acts." This reasoning
would have also led the Court to the conclusion that denying a defense
based on immunity with regards to such acts was the only available course
of action.
Therefore, the distinction made by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal
on whether the crimes allegedly committed by the defendant in the Swarna
case where "official" or not becomes a good starting point on the way to
piercing immunities effectively, especially with regards to IOs and bringing
them in line with the accepted restrictive immunities practice of sovereign
states.52
B. The OSS Nokalva Inc. v. European Space Agency Case (2010)
OSS Nokalva (OSSN) and the European Space Agency (ESA) were
working under a series of four commercial contracts, each of them
including a dispute settlement clause.53 The first contract referred the
parties to arbitration, while the other three granted jurisdiction to the Courts
of the State of New Jersey over disputes arising between the parties.
Following these clauses, OSSN filed suit against ESA before the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Somerset County.55 ESA moved to dismiss the claim,
alleging immunity from prosecution under the International Organizations
Immunity Act (IOIA).56 This motion to dismiss was denied by the District
Court.s,
Although the District Court stated that ESA, as an 10, enjoyed
immunity from prosecution, it held that such immunity could be expressly
50. Id. at 134-38.
51. See Swarna, 622 F.3d at 134-38.
52. Id.
53. See generally OSS Nokalva Inc. v. Eur. Space Agency, No. 08-3169, 2009 WL 2424702,
at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2009).
54. Id. at * 1.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *3.
57. Id. at *8.
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waived by the 10.58 It went further to conclude that by engaging in
commercial activity and due to the dispute resolution clauses included in
the contracts, ESA had expressly waived its immunity and therefore, could
not bring this argument before the Court as a defense on admissibility. 9
Both ESA and OSSN appealed the District Court's decision for different
reasons. 6
1. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The Federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals deemed it unnecessary to
determine whether ESA had actually waived its immunity, because
according to its interpretation of the laws regarding immunity, ESA was not
immune from civil suit in the first place.
The Court started with an analysis of IOIA, which states that IOs
"shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every other form of judicial
process as is enjoyed by foreign governments."62 In relation to this
wording, the Court discussed if such phrasing was intended to mean that
IOs would always be entitled to absolute immunity-as was the case of
foreign governments when IOIA was enacted-or on the contrary, whether
it meant that since the approach towards absolute immunity of foreign
sovereigns had shifted since the enactment of IOIA to a more restricted
practice, the new restrictive provisions of FSIA63 would automatically be
incorporated into IOIA by analogy.64 FSIA became binding US law in
1976 and codified then accepted restrictive immunities practice on the part
of sovereign states, setting out an express set of exceptions to the defense of
immunity in the case of commercial dealings and tort claims.s
According to the Court, the correct approach consists of incorporating
the contents of the new provisions of the FSIA, codifying the laws of
immunities to the wording of the IOIA. In other words, the Court held
that the absolute immunity theory is no longer justified and is not
58. See generally OSSNokalva Inc., 2009 WL 2424702, at *3.
59. Id. at 7-8.
60. See generally OSS Nokalva Inc. v. Eur. Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 760-61(3rd Cir.
2010).
61. Id. at 760-61.
62. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1945).
63. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act § 1330.
64. Compare International Organizations Immunities Act § 288a(b) with Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act § 1330.
65. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act § 1330.
66. OSS Nokalva Inc. v. Eur. Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 763 (3rd Cir. 2010).
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compatible with the IOIA, nor does it make any sense in today's globally
recognized climate of restricted sovereign immunity. 7 The Court also said
that:
ESA's contrary position leads to an anomalous result. If a
foreign government, such as Germany, had contracted with
OSSN, it would not be immune from suit because the FSIA
provides that a foreign government involved in a commercial
arrangement such as that in this case may be sued, as ESA
acknowledged at oral argument. We find no compelling reason
why a group of states acting through an international
organization is entitled to broader immunity than its member
states enjoy when acting alone. Indeed, such a policy may create
an incentive for foreign governments to evade legal obligations
by acting through international organizations.
The Court, therefore, concludes that ESA is not entitled to immunity
as it existed for sovereigns in 1945. Furthermore, the Court also upheld the
District Court's findings that by not being immune from civil prosecution,
ESA would benefit from being able to access the market and perform
commercial transactions with other actors in it.69 The Court concluded by
saying that the same reasoning applied for drafting the FSIA's commercial
exception to immunity and is equally applicable to IOs through the IOIA. 0
The OSSN case is relevant to the discussion of the validity and
applicability of immunities to IOs in that it circles back to the debate that
actually originated the distinction between the absolute and functional
theories of immunity.71 In a very straightforward decision, the Court went
on to conclude that, were absolute immunity to apply indiscriminately,
there would be no guarantees of judicial protection when conducting
business at the international level and therefore, this would greatly and
adversely affect the business environment.7 2 Since this reasoning cannot
follow the needs and desires of an ever more globalized society, it is just
logical that IOs would be willing to either waive or permanently restrict
their immunity, at least with regards to commercial activity.
In the best case scenario, IOs would voluntarily adopt and incorporate
the restrictive immunity theory, asserting its full immunity only for those
67. Id. at 765.
68. Id. at 763.
69. Id. at 765.
70. Id. at 764.
71. See generally OSS Nokalva Inc., 617 F.3d at 756.
72. Id. at 765.
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cases where the IOs' acts were being performed in pursuit of a sovereign
purpose or when their functionality would be otherwise significantly
compromised.
C. Case of Sabeh El Leil v. France (European Court of Human Rights)
This is the case of a French national who was employed by the
Embassy of Kuwait in Paris as an accountant and then chief accountant.
He was wrongfully terminated after more than twenty years in service. 74
He filed suit before national courts, which determined that absolute
immunity applied to his case, and, therefore, dismissed his claims without
granting any redress. Mr. Sabeh El Leil brought his case before the
European Court of Human Rights, alleging that by finding that the State of
Kuwait was immune from prosecution, the French State denied him his
fundamental right of access to justice, as stipulated by Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
The ECHR ruled in favor of the applicant, finding that since his daily
tasks were purely administrative and not sovereign in nature, the Embassy
could not raise an absolute immunity claim as a defense on admissibility,
because in doing so, it had the adverse effect of violating Article 6 of the
European Convention, causing gross prejudice to the claimant.n Therefore,
the ECHR decided that, by recognizing the immunity, France had violated
its international obligations under Article 6 of the ECHR to the claimant.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The results in the foregoing cases, when taken as a whole, suggest that
the ability to assert absolute immunity on the part of IOs, may be finally
coming to an end, and with it, the possibility to act towards its employees
and its innocent third party victims with impunity. By being forced into
line with the more restrictive immunities enjoyed by sovereign states in
most national or municipal courts where they find themselves the target of a
lawsuit, regardless of the violations claimed, the depth and breadth of 10
immunity seems to be on the wane.
73. Case of Sabeh El Leil v. France, No. 34869/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 29, 2011),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=I&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight-Sabeh%20
%7C%20El%20%7C%2OLeil%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%20France&sessionid=884719 10&skin=hudoc-
en (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
74. Id. at 1-6.
75. Id. at 13.
76. Id. at 35.
77. Id. at 67.
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It has long since been evident that the theory of "functional
necessity"7 ceased to play a fundamental role in the way international
relations were conducted over the course of the second half of the 20th
century. Further, the current trends at the international level have been
more focused on the protection and promotion of human rights of
individuals vis-A-vis the prerogatives of states or their rulers. It is about
time this same approach was applied to IOs, treating them as just another
group of actors that can be held accountable for their acts and omissions in
the international scenario-especially those violations that have to do with
gross violations of International Human Rights Law, International
Humanitarian Law, and jus cogens.79 Let us keep in mind that protecting
these rights was the main goal for creating most IOs in the first place.
It is just logical that in this case, change should come from within.
Any IO that is truly complying with its mandate of serving humanity
should, by now, have started the process of reform to adjust the legal
framework in order to provide a wider protection for individuals to whom it
causes injury.
The U.N., for instance, has the necessary instruments within to be able
to start this process on its own at any moment. It is no secret that the
International Law Commission (LLC) has drafted, in recent times, several
pieces of proposed international legislation that strive for the enhancement
of human rights protection. Such is the case of the widely known ILC
Articles on State Responsibility-which can be clearly said to counter the
former theory of absolute State immunity-and the Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations.so Whether the ILC is the
right forum to change the state of play regarding the immunity of IOs is yet
to be seen, but debating it within seems to be a good starting point. Mr.
Ban himself could bring this topic to the ILC's agenda.
Rather than waiting for a national court to deliver the coup de grdce to
such immunity in a piece-mail fashion-a current contract dispute case
against the United Nations Development Programme pending in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York may well do just
78. Flaherty & Rios, supra note 7, at 454.
79. Id. at 444-48.
80. See generally Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
with commentaries, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9 6_2001.pdf (last visited Mar. 14,
2012); Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, [2011] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
2, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
draft/o20articles/9_11_2011 .pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
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that8 '-Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon should begin the process to greatly
restrict the immunity of the U.N. and its specialized agencies for contracts
and tortious acts of its officials without delay, along the lines of the FSIA.
The U.N. Charter and the goals for which the U.N. is supposed to stand
demand no less. And once the immunity is fundamentally pierced by a
national court, it will be difficult to maintain those aspects of it which still
make sense today-such as the immunity of U.N. peace-keepers in war-tom
regions-although of course, not for their ultra vires acts, such as rape or
spreading a pandemic among a helpless civilian population.
81. Sadikoglu v. U.N. Dev. Programme, No. 11 Civ. 0294, 2011 WL 4953994, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2011).
4532012]
